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DOES COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW HAVE PERVERSE EFFECTS?
ADRIAN VERMEULE *
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a crucial, although implicit, empirical assumption in the
debate about federal judicial review under the affirmative Commerce
Clause. The assumption, indulged by many different camps in the
debate, is that Commerce Clause review decreases the centralization of
policymaking by shifting policy authority to the states.1 I want to
suggest that, on equally plausible empirical assumptions, Commerce
Clause review will in fact do just the opposite: it will promote the
centralization of public policy at the national level by providing
congressional coalitions with ex ante incentives to legislate more broadly,
and to create national programs that are more comprehensive, than they
would otherwise choose. So those who favor Commerce Clause review
because they favor decentralization may have picked a course of action
with perverse effects; they may have picked the wrong team. And those
who favor Commerce Clause review because they believe the
Constitution commands it should take into account that increased
centralization may be a cost of their position.
II. R EACTIONARY CRITIQUES OF FEDERALISM REVIEW
Let me start with a brief typology of reactionary arguments against
the recent wave of judicially-enforced federalism. By "reactionary" I
mean arguments that favor return to the immediate status quo ante 1995
(the date of Lopez v. United States), 2 or whenever we date the start of the
current period. Defenders of the United States Supreme Court's recent
decisions are sometimes called reactionary, because some of them claim
to favor a return to some pre-1937 state of affairs.3 That claim, however,
is just the standard rhetoric of revolutionaries, who attribute all good
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Prepared for "New Voices on
the New Federalism," Villanova Law School, October 28, 2000. Thanks to Jack
Goldsmith, Daryl Levinson, Eric Posner, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein and the
Symposium participants for helpful comments, and to the editors of the Villanova Law
Review for helpful editing. Stephanie Morris and Jamil Jaffer provided excellent
research assistance.
1. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After
Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES . L. REV . 801, 842-43 (1996) (explaining impact of Commerce
Clause review under Lopez on congressional action to federalize state or local crimes);
Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES . L. REV . 643, 655-58 (1996)
(noting one assumption underlying United States v. Lopez is that Court favors
"significant decentralization"). In Brickey's view, Lopez counters the congressional
trend towards federalizing traditionally state-controlled acts by serving as a
"reminder that, contrary to contemporary thought, congressional power under the
Commerce Clause is not unlimited, that states have primary authority to define and
enforce criminal laws, and that much of what Congress has enacted needlessly alters
the balance between federal and state jurisdiction." Brickey, supra, at 843-44.
2. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
3. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1995 No. 1 REG. 83, 83-84
(1995) (book review) (noting that some scholars "labor on in the hope of a restoration"
of "ancient exiles," such as Commerce Clause, to their status of sixty years ago).

things to some imagined past era of virtuous government. That is why
Justice Souter, the most consistently Burkean member of the current
Court, condemns the revival of judicially-enforced federalism as a
disruption of a workable status quo.4
Albert Hirschman classifies reactionary rhetoric into jeopardy
arguments, futility arguments and perversity arguments.5 Jeopardy
arguments object to a proposal on the ground that it jeopardizes some
other value the proponent holds dear. In the federalism context, the
jeopardy arguments are weak. It has been said that judicial review of
federal statutes in the name of federalism is undemocratic, except that
here the counter-majoritarian difficulty doesn’t seem terribly troubling.
Federalism review doesn’t place any policy domain off limits to
democratic majorities; it reallocates policymaking authority between
national and local majorities. Other jeopardy arguments might point out
that judicially-enforced federalism jeopardizes gun control, or protection
of endangered species, or some other substantive value. But the best
jeopardy arguments point to shared values whose protection is
appealing to all participants in the debate, whereas these substantive
ends are, in some circles, as contentious as federalism itself.
A futility argument claims that the proposal at issue will be useless
or inconsequential; it will not accomplish the goal it seeks. Here, the
most common futility argument is the claim, advanced insistently by
Justice Souter, that Commerce Clause review will prove fruitless
because the doctrinal categories the Court uses or can use are too
permeable and unstable. 6 But it’s hard to see why that is any more true
for the Commerce Clause than for due process of law. 7 A more
sophisticated claim is that the recent Commerce Clause decisions just
don’t matter very much,8 although one hears much less of that view
since the warning shot across Congress' bow in Lopez has been followed
by the full-out broadside of United States v. Morrison. 9 It might also be
said that the commerce cases are not as consequential as the other
federalism cases about commandeering, state sovereign immunity and
so on. But that claim specifies no metric for making the comparative
judgment of consequentiality. Striking down any federal statute is
consequential in one sense, but on a broader view the whole institution
of judicial review may be unimportant, in that the presence or absence

4. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that previous Court
decisions "overriding congressional policy choices under the Commerce Clause" were
flawed and "[t]here is no reason to expect the lesson would be different another
time"). See generally Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory
and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV . 619, 654-56, 717 (1994) (arguing that
Justice Souter's jurisprudential commitments are Burkean).
5. See generally A LBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, T HE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY,
FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991).
6. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628 -29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7. See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 D UKE L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 2001).
8. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 829 (stating that "instincts and beliefs of most of the
Justices [on Lopez] are unlikely to result in any important changes in the scope of
national regulatory power").
9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Morrison held, inter alia, that Congress lacked Commerce
Clause authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act. See id. at 602.

of judicial review apparently makes little difference to the freedom,
prosperity or welfare of an economically-developed polity. 10
A perversity argument is less dismal than a futility argument. It
claims not that the proposal will be useless, but that it will be
affirmatively counterproductive, producing results in the opposite
direction from the one intended. The best-known perversity argument
against federalism review is Justice Stevens' claim that an anticommandeering rule will simply produce more outright federal
preemption of state law. 11 Stevens' point is that for states-righters this is
perverse, because the creation of new federal bureaucracies to enforce
preemptive statutes may displace more state activity than does
commandeering. But sheer quantity of intrusion is not the central
objection to commandeering. Instead the objection, for whatever it may
be worth, is that commandeering inflicts an expressive or dignitary
offense to state sovereignty. 12 So Stevens' argument can only be
reconstructed, if at all, as a jeopardy point: an anti-commandeering rule
will produce greater policy centralization through federal preemption,
and that centralization is objectionable on other grounds.
There are analogous arguments in the cases concerning state
sovereign immunity from private damages suits in federal courts 13 or in
state courts.14 Perhaps forbidding private damages suits against states
will merely increase the number of suits against states brought by the
United States, which are not barred, or suits by private parties for
injunctive relief against state officials. In the latter case, the bar on
damages suits will itself contribute to the necessary showing of
irreparable injury. 15
Here too, however, the seeming perversity
argument is really best understood as a jeopardy argument, because the
harm that flows from the new form of federalism review is not truly a
perverse harm. It does not damage the very interest the Court is
attempting to protect; it damages a different interest. Rightly or
wrongly, much Eleventh Amendment/immunity doctrine seems to
assume that states suffer a special dignitary offense in private damages
suits that they do not suffer in other types of suits. Rules that encourage

10. See ROBERT A. D AHL , D EMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 189-91 (1989) (noting that
liberal democracies without full judicial review are not systematically less democratic
or prosperous than United States).
11. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 959 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT . REV . 71, 92-95 (examining claim that
commandeering "infringes upon the state's functioning as a political community in a
distinctive and emphatic way"). Adler and Kreimer convincingly dispose of the idea,
central to New York v. United States but downplayed in Printz, that the critical
objection to commandeering is that it undermines the accountability of federal
lawmakers. See id. at 99-101.
13. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 did not validly abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
14. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding Congress may not
subject non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts).
15. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment,
Irreparable Injury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV . 1311, 1314-17 (2001).

substitution from one type to the other are not perverse, although they
may be misguided in other respects.
There is a true perversity argument relevant to the federalism cases,
but it applies only to the Commerce Clause. I will advance that
argument here.
III. THE POTENTIALLY PERVERSE EFFECTS OF COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW
A. The Theoretical Problem
For ease of exposition, I shall stipulate that those who support
Commerce Clause review do so because: (1) they support policy
decentralization; and (2) they assume that Commerce Clause review will
promote that goal. 16 This is a soft rational-choice assumption that
allows maximizing actors to hold preferences over institutional
arrangements, as well as over substantive policies.17 A different view
would hold that the Justices who support Commerce Clause review do
so because they believe the Constitution requires it. But I need not
contest that possibility, because all the points I want to make hold
whether or not it is true. Even Justices who vote their best constitutional
understanding of the Commerce Clause would want to know, or should
want to know, the costs and benefits of doing so – in part because most
(plausible) interpretive theories hold that the consequences of
alternative interpretations are themselves relevant to the determination
of meaning,18 even if consequences are not dispositive, and also because
the role morality of the judge does not license blindness to the
consequences of action. So it matters, even on this view of what the
Justices maximize, whether the recent resurgence of Commerce Clause
review promotes centralization or localism.
The more interesting question is whether the revival of Commerce
Clause review will indeed promote decentralization. The standard
assumption is that it will, and that view has intuitive appeal. Suppose
that at some given time, courts are engaging in no Commerce Clause

16. These are descriptive premises. I mean to take no position on the claim that
the normative arguments for federalism are merely arguments for administrative
decentralization. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV . 903, 914-26 (1994).
17. But see Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV . 1305, 1307 13 (1999). Cross' view seems to be that nobody cares about which level of
government makes what decision; instead people care only about substantive
outcomes, and all federalism rhetoric is opportunistic. See id. at 1307 (arguing that
"federalism is consistently . . . employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some
other ideological end, rather than as a principled end in and of itself"). But that claim
faces too many counter-examples. Any view that requires attributing to Chief Justice
Rehnquist a substantive preference for allowing guns to be carried near schools never
gets off the ground. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating
Gun-Free Schools Zone Act of 1990). To be sure, the proponent of decentralization
may hope that it will promote some more remote substantive end. The libertarian
defender of property rights, for example, may hope that inter-jurisdictional
competition will protect property from redistributive legislation. See Richard A.
Epstein, The Proper Scope of Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV . 1387, 1454 (1987). But the
proximate preference is still institutional, not substantive.
18. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE P ROBLEMS OF J URISPRUDENCE 299-302 (1990)
(discussing consequentialism in statutory interpretation).

review – roughly the situation before Lopez. 19 After that time, as the
courts move incrementally from no Commerce Clause review to
moderate Commerce Clause review – striking down a couple of statutes,
as in Lopez and Morrison – judges may assume that centralization
decreases linearly. After all, the courts are striking down federal
statutes on the ground that the statute exceeds the federal government's
constitutional authority, even though the states may enact precisely the
same rule, absent some other constitutional prohibition. There is also
another decentralizing effect: not only are judges wiping out national
regulatory statutes, but legislative coalitions may sometimes take
account of the new constitutional restrictions by filtering out proposed
bills that would violate them (if the risk of judicial invalidation makes
Congress less likely, rather than more likely, to enact unconstitutional
laws – admittedly a murky question).
But the assumption that an incremental increase in Commerce
Clause review produces a linear decrease in centralization may get
things backwards. Instead, a move from no Commerce Clause review to
some Commerce Clause review may produce an increase in
centralization. To be sure, a further move to even more intensive review
– a move from the position of the Lopez majority opinion to say, Justice
Thomas' concurring position 20 – might begin to effect real
decentralization. But that is just to say that centralization, as a function
of increasingly stringent Commerce Clause review, might not be
continuously decreasing, but rather might display an inverted U-shape.
This inverted U-shape arises if and when the doctrines the courts
use at the intermediate intensities of review allow Congress to enact
otherwise-unconstitutional policies by broadening their scope or by
bundling them together with valid policies.
The proponent of
Commerce Clause review assumes that if Congress enacts policy P and
the courts strike it down, then the decision has increased
decentralization or, equivalently, prevented a new centralization. But if
the courts' rules allow or encourage Congress to enact P so long as P is
broadened to include some admittedly constitutional policy Q, or is
bundled together with policy Q, then the result of striking down P may
not be to remit the decision about P to the states. It may simply be to
produce a federal statute that mandates both P and Q, either because
Congress reenacts the invalidated statute in its new, more expansive
form, or because Congress anticipates the effect of the judicial rule and
enacts the expansive form of the statute in the first instance.
Current doctrine under the Commerce Clause has just this effect of
encouraging the broadening and bundling of federal policies. Two
doctrines are critical: the aggregation principle and the comprehensive19. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 80 (1981) (applying rational basis test, which requ ires court to defer to congressional
findings that regulated activity affects interstate commerce); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 155 -56 (1971) (same); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-301
(1964) (same); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 -53 (1964)
(same).
20. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 597 -602 (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating judicial
enforcement of distinction between "commerce" and "manufacturing").

scheme principle. Aggregation is familiar. The Court has said since
Wickard v. Filburn 21 that the substantial-effects test should be applied,
not to some particular instance of a regulated intrastate activity, but to
the class of all such instances taken in the aggregate.22 Morrison added
that aggregation has only been allowed (and presumably will only be
allowed) for intrastate activities that are themselves economic or
commercial. 23 It is clear that the aggregation principle "condition[s] the
Commerce Clause power to accomplish a certain goal on Congress
legislating far more broadly than necessary," as John Nagle puts it,
because the effect of the principle is that "if Congress gathers enough
substantial impacts into the covered class, the trivial impacts can be
regulated, too." 24
The comprehensive-scheme principle has a similar consequence.
This principle holds that the regulation of some activity that Congress
could not reach standing alone, because the activity occurs intrastate
and lacks a substantial effect on commerce in its own right, may
nonetheless be constitutionally permissible if the regulation of that
activity is essential or integral to the maintenance of a larger regulatory
regime governing interstate activity or commercial activity or both. This
idea is at least as old as the Shreveport Rate Cases, 25 but it takes center
stage in Hodel v. Indiana,26 which stated that challenged provisions not
valid in themselves will be upheld if they are "an integral part of [a]
regulatory program" that is valid when taken as a whole.27 And the
idea surfaces in Lopez itself in a critical passage that has gone largely
unnoticed by commentators. The Gun-Free School Zones Act, the Court
said:
is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated.
It cannot,
therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations
of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce. 28
The lower courts, however, did notice this passage, and they have
frequently invoked the quoted passage from Lopez, both before and after
Morrison. 29 I’ll give some examples below of cases that uphold statutes
21. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
22. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28; John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV . 174, 193 (1998) (positing that
Wickard "has come to stand for" aggregation).
23. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 673 (2000) ("While we need not
adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity
in order to d ecide these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature.").
24. Nagle, supra note 22, at 200 -01.
25. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
26. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
27. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 329 n.17.
28. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 491 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting the
passage after Morrison); United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1016 (5th Cir. 1997)
(quoting the passage before Morrison).

very much like the statute struck down in Lopez, merely because those
statutes were packaged along with a larger national regulatory scheme.
But here I’ll mention an important case decided after Morrison which
shows that bundling provisions can ensure the validity of all of them.
The decision is Gibbs v. Babbitt, 30 in which the Fourth Circuit upheld
federal regulations that limited the killing of endangered red wolves on
private land in North Carolina.
Lopez and Morrison announced that the commerce power authorizes
congressional regulation of: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2)
instrumentalities, persons or things moving in interstate commerce; and
(3) intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.31
Gibbs upheld the red wolf regulation on the ground that it fell within the
third Lopez/Morrison category. 32 The court invoked the aggregation
principle to brush aside the objection that killing a single wolf doesn’t
affect interstate commerce.33 Killing all the red wolves would affect
interstate commerce by eliminating the red wolf tourism industry and in
other ways.34 But Morrison says that only intrastate "commercial" or
"economic" activities can be aggregated,35 and killing a red wolf doesn’t
look very much like commercial or economic activity. The court said a
killing might have a commercial or economic motivation, if the farmer
was trying to protect his livestock or homestead, 36 but so might carrying
a gun around a school, if the gun owner is selling drugs to young
children and wants to protect his sales territory against competitors.
Given the weakness of the aggregation argument, it is not
surprising that the court also invoked the comprehensive-scheme
principle.37 The red wolf regulation, the court said, was "sustainable as
'an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity.'" 38 The
plaintiffs in Gibbs hadn’t challenged the facial validity of the
Endangered Species Act under the Commerce Clause, so the court could
simply assume that the Act is indeed a valid national regulatory scheme
that bundled red wolf protection with protections for many other
endangered species in other states. The bundling appeared critical:
"[G]iven that Congress has the ability to enact a broad scheme for the
conservation of endangered species," the court wrote, "it is not for the
30. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
31. See Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598, 671 (2000) (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 558-59).
32. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491 -99.
33. See id. at 493 ("While the taking of one red wolf on private land may not be
'substantial,' the takings of red wolves in the aggregate have a sufficient impact on
interstate commerce to uphold this regulation.").
34. See id. at 492.
35. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 676. Justice Breyer's dissent reads the majority as
permitting two exceptions to this rule: (1) Congress may aggregate noneconomic
activity that takes place at economic establishments and (2) Congress may regulate
intrastate noneconomic activities where the regulation is an essential part of a
comprehensive national regulatory scheme. See id. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For
a further discussion of the second exception, see infra notes 47-52 and accompanying
text.
36. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 492.
37. See id. at 497-99.
38. Id. at 497 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).

courts to invalidate individual regulations." 39 This can only mean that
the red wolf regulation, even if unconstitutional standing alone, was
constitutional because it was packaged with a broader set of valid
prohibitions.
This emphasizes one important difference between the
comprehensive-scheme principle and the aggregation principle. The
two are closely related, because federal regulation of a class of activities
that affects interstate commerce when taken in the aggregate will often
be integral to the success of a comprehensive national regulatory
scheme.
But the best reading of the cases suggests that the
comprehensive-scheme principle, unlike the aggregation principle, may
allow Congress to regulate intrastate activities that are not themselves
commercial or economic, so long as the regulation is integral to the
success of a larger valid scheme of (interstate or commercial) regulation.
The key passage from Lopez, for example, suggests that the scheme taken
as a whole must regulate economic activity, while the ancillary
regulation need not itself do so, at least if the ancillary regulation "arises
out of" or is "connected to" commercial activity.40 Judge Edith Jones,
who is occasionally unsympathetic to national regulation, understands
the comprehensive-scheme principle in this way. 41 So does Justice
Breyer: in an insightful passage in his Morrison dissent, he asked
whether the comprehensive-scheme principle would allow Congress to
"save the present law [the Violence Against Women Act] by including it,
or much of it, in a broader 'Safe Transport' or 'Workplace Safety' act?"42
We don’t know, of course, whether the Court will eventually confirm
this understanding, but certainly that’s currently the law in the lower
courts, as I will discuss later.
B. An Example
The aggregation and comprehensive-scheme principles allow and
encourage Congress to ensure the constitutionality of otherwise-suspect
provisions by broadening their scope, or by bundling them into a
comprehensive scheme of national economic regulation. The ex ante
effect of the current rules, then, may just as easily promote broader
federal regulation – policy centralization – as retard it. A simple
numerical example will illustrate the effect. Imagine that there are three
legislators, A, B and C. They are considering three proposals:
• Proposal 1 is a bill titled the "Gun-Free Nation Act." Section 1 of
the Act prohibits the transportation or use of handguns in interstate
commerce and is clearly constitutional under current doctrine. Section 2
of the Act prohibits the bare possession of a handgun, anywhere.
• Proposal 2 prohibits possession of a handgun within 1,000 feet of a
school. This is the "Gun-Free School Zones Act" invalidated in Lopez. 43
39. Id. at 498.
40. For the text of the passage from Lopez, see supra text accompanying note 28.
41. See United States v. Kirk, 105 F.3d 997, 1013 -14 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(Jones, J., dissenting) (distinguishing regulations of economic activity that
substantially affect interstate commerce from regulations of simple "activity" essential
to maintaining larger regime of interstate economic regulation).
42. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 700 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V).

• Proposal 3 is that there be no federal handgun regulation (the
status quo ante).
Our three legislators are assumed to have the following preference
ordering over these choices:
A (1>2>3)
B (3>2>1)
C (2>1>3)
(reading "Z(p>q>r)" to mean "legislator Z prefers proposal p to proposal
q and prefers proposal q to proposal r").
The interesting legislator here is C. Legislators A and B are
ideologues who both arrange the bills in order of their centralizing
effects, although they evaluate those effects from opposing normative
premises. C, however, has a complex preference structure: she is a
moderate who opposes comprehensive national gun regulation, but
prefers that to no national gun regulation at all. C has a puzzling
worldview from the standpoint of someone who is ideologically
committed either to seeing any incremental centralization as good (A) or
any incremental centralization as bad (B), because C's preferences aren’t
arranged in order of the bill's centralizing tendency. Why might C have
that preference structure? Well, why not? Voting for a broad statute
imposes political costs on C, in the loss of political support from
regulated parties, but voting to maintain the non-regulation status quo
would forfeit political support from those who desire regulation. In C's
case, these forces might net out as described.
Given the preferences of legislators A, B and C, imagine a series of
pairwise votes across the three proposals. In a vote between proposals 1
and 2, 2 wins, while in a vote between proposals 2 and 3, 2 wins.
Proposal 2, the Gun-Free School Zones Act, is enacted. 44 After Proposal
2 is enacted, a court strikes it down as exceeding congressional authority
over commerce.
Proponents of localism dance in the streets.
Subsequently, however, there is another vote between Proposal 3 and
Proposal 1. The winner is Proposal 1 – the Gun-Free Nation Act
becomes law. 45
Is Section 2 of that law – the part that prohibits the bare possession
of a handgun, anywhere – constitutional? The courts of appeals think
so. Consider 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which prohibits the simple "possession"
of a machinegun acquired after 1986.46 The section number should ring
44. Note that the order in which the pairwise votes were taken is completely
immaterial. Proposal 2 is a "Condorcet winner" – it defeats all other proposals in
pairwise competition. There is no voting cycle here and no aggregation problem.
The preferences of the individual legislators and the group-level preferences are all
perfectly well-behaved.
45. The analysis would be entirely different, of course, if we replace legislator C
with a legislator, D, who has the preferences (2>3>1). In that case the ultimate
winner would be Proposal 3, no federal regulation, rather than Proposal 1. But that is
not inconsistent with my claim, which is just that Commerce Clause review can in
principle have perverse effects, so long as legislators' preferences are arranged in the
way illustrated in the text. Which arrangement of legislators' preferences actually
obtains in any given case is an empirical question. For a further discussion of the
empirical issues, see infra section "C. The Empirical Problem."
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1994). The statute actually prohibits both "possession"
and "transfer," but in the cases I discuss, the latter prohibition was not at issue.

a muffled bell. The statute struck down in Lopez was 18 U.S.C. § 922(q);
both provisions derive from the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of
1986.47 The eight circuits that have considered the constitutionality of
the machinegun possession ban have all upheld it. 48 The opinions
commonly distinguish Lopez on the ground that broader federal
regulation is more constitutionally defensible. The Third Circuit, for
example, reasoned that the Gun-Free School Zones Act attempted to
regulate possession only within school zones – "a discrete area unlikely
to have a meaningful aggregate effect on commerce" – while the
machinegun statute should be sustained because it is a general (albeit,
intrastate) ban.49 This is the perverse effect of the aggregation principle:
broaden the statute's reach and there are more applications to aggregate,
until the bar of the substantial-effects test has been cleared.
An objection to this analysis is that, after Morrison, only economic
activities can be aggregated, and possession of a machinegun does not
look economic in any simple sense. So an even more popular rationale
for upholding § 922(o) has been the comprehensive-scheme principle.
The Second Circuit, following and summarizing precedent from all over
the nation, distinguished Lopez on the ground that the machinegun
statute is "integral to a larger federal scheme for the regulation of
trafficking in firearms." 50 The standard claim is that the federal
regulatory scheme both dampens supply, by prohibiting the trafficking
and sale of firearms in interstate commerce, and also dampens demand,
by criminalizing intrastate possession. The demand-side regulation,
then, is a necessary auxiliary to the supply-side regulation, and the
supply-side regulation is clearly valid as an interstate regulation of
commercial traffic. The flaw in the Gun-Free School Zones Act, on this
theory, is that it didn’t ban enough intrastate possession to squelch the
demand-side of the firearms market.51
Both the aggregation theory and the comprehensive-scheme theory
support our hypothetical Gun-Free Nation Act. Section 1 is clearly
constitutional. Section 2 can be upheld on the aggregation ground if we
describe the prohibition as "economic," and by the Second Circuit's
reasoning it can certainly be upheld as an essential part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. The ban on handgun possession is a
necessary auxiliary measure for dampening the demand-side of the
market for illegal handguns, a market whose supply-side Congress has
attacked by an interstate regulation of unquestioned validity. By either
expanding the reach of the prohibition to aggregate more conduct, or by
47. See Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308 (enacting
prohibitions against gun possession and usage).
48. See United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 96 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding
section 922(o) of Firearms Owners' Protection Act under Commerce Clause); United
States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 1997) (same), vacated on other grounds,
133 F.3d 1412 (1998); United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 30-31 (5th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (same); United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 285 (3d Cir. 1996) (same);
United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781, 784 -87 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); United States
v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 891 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d
948, 952 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518, 1521 -22 (10th Cir.
1995) (same).
49. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282.
50. Franklyn, 157 F.3d at 94.
51. Thus the Gun-Free School Zones Act could not have been upheld on the
analysis discussed here.

bundling the intrastate prohibition with a comprehensive interstate
regulatory scheme, Congress can ensure the constitutionality of a
provision that would be unconstitutional in its narrower, unbundled
state. The upshot is that the Gun-Free Nation Act will probably be
upheld by the courts. The final result is an increase in centralization,
relative not only to the no-regulation baseline, but also to the law held
unconstitutional on federalism grounds. That result is perverse from the
decentralizers' point of view.
Put another way, decentralizers like Justice Thomas have
overlooked that if you can’t get your first choice, you’re not necessarily
better off the closer you get to your first choice. From Thomas' point of
view, the first choice would be an extremely restrictive view of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. But he can’t get
that, so Thomas has joined opinions like Lopez and Morrison, while
issuing brief concurrences that tell us he is merely voting for the rule
closest to his own preferences within the feasible set.52 But the effect of
the Court's intermediate position may be to move outcomes away from,
not towards, Thomas' preferences, even relative to the pre-Lopez
baseline. If Thomas' first-choice position derives from a preference for
localism, he should consider joining Justice Breyer and the other
dissenters.
From the point of view of moderately pro-federalism Justices like
O'Connor and Kennedy, the error is also perfectly natural. Here is one
plausible picture of the moderates' thinking. Starting from a baseline of
no Commerce Clause review at all, these Justices desire to increase the
intensity of review just a bit, eliminating a few statutes they see as
largely symbolic outliers, such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act and
the Violence Against Women Act, 53 but without destabilizing politically
entrenched legislation such as the New Deal entitlement statutes or the
Endangered Species Act. 54 So the natural position is to say that the
outlier statutes don’t have a sufficient effect on commerce, or the right
kind of effect, while developing doctrinal exceptions that protect
comprehensive federal programs. The problem is that, so long as the
reigning legislative coalition understands the rules and prefers some
program to no program at all, newly-enacted programs will tend to
become more comprehensive.
In both cases the proponents of localism have overlooked that, once
the intermediate option is eliminated, there is no particular reason to
assume a priori that the second choice of federal legislators will be no
federal regulation, as opposed to far-reaching federal regulation.
Precisely analogous perverse effects turn up in many areas of law in
which courts or regulators knock out an intermediate option without
anticipating that the regulated parties may then be driven to an extreme
that is even less desirable.
Consider Nollan v. California Coastal
52. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 682 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (enacted as part of Violence Against Women Act); 18
U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V) (enacted as part of Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994).

Commission, 55 in which the Court held that localities couldn’t condition a
development permit on a nongermane concession, such as beachfront
access. Some property-rights fans expected that after Nollan local
governments would start granting permits without conditions. William
Fischel has argued that, in fact, localities might just refuse to grant
permits at all, 56 and although the issues are complicated, he is clearly
right that that effect is empirically possible. For another example,
consider the claim – whether valid or not – that the Court has erred by
requiring states to provide equal welfare benefits to long-time residents
and to recent arrivals.57 The states' reaction may not be to level up by
giving recent arrivals as much as established residents are getting; the
states may well level down by cutting benefits for both groups.
These are just two examples among many. The first example
illustrates a general problem in unconstitutional conditions cases, where
the question is whether invalidating the condition will produce benefits
without conditions or no benefits at all. The second illustrates a general
problem in equal protection cases, where the question is whether
barring a discriminatory program will cause political actors to provide a
nondiscriminatory program or to abolish the program altogether. In all
of these cases, whether the result can be described as "perverse" turns
upon what we are trying to achieve. From an egalitarian standpoint, for
example, it doesn’t matter whether an inequality is cured by leveling
down or leveling up. But the important point is that the effect of
knocking out intermediate options is unpredictable across contexts.
C. The Empirical Problem
All I have demonstrated so far is that a perverse effect is possible;
there is absolutely no reason to assume a priori that increasing the
intensity of Commerce Clause review, from a baseline of no review,
causes a linear decrease in centralization. It may well cause an increase
in centralization, as congressional coalitions that prefer a broad federal
regulatory scheme to no federal regulation at all broaden and bundle
provisions to ensure their constitutionality. That response would persist
until the Court moved to a far more intensive form of review a la
Thomas. But the Court has no stomach for that course of action; it is not
politically feasible. As a result, the principal consequence of the recent
revival of Commerce Clause review may be to increase the
centralization of national policymaking.
The next question is whether the possibility of perverse effects is
empirically serious or not. There is no "burden of proof" on this
question; proponents of Commerce Clause review who assume a
decentralizing effect have no foundation for their assumption, so we
have to approach the empirical question without presuppositions in
either direction. Here I shall first sketch some of the variables that an
empirical analysis would have to consider, and then I’ll ask what courts
should do about the Commerce Clause if (or during the period that)
55. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
56. See William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV . 1581, 1583 (1988) (suggesting prohibitions on conditions
are barrier to land improvement).
57. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).

they have no definitive answer to the empirical question about the
magnitude of perverse effects.
One natural starting point leads down a blind alley. This is the
observation that striking down statutes is likely to reduce the total
volume of federal law because political inertia – the costs of legislating
produced by bicameralism, presentment, and so on – make it difficult
for Congress to respond by re-enacting a broader or bundled statute to
save a statute that has recently been invalidated. It’s not so clear that the
conventional image of the inertia-ridden Congress is sensible, but the
real flaw in the observation is analytical. It’s true that when narrow
statutes like the Gun-Free School Zones Act are invalidated, inertia may
prevent Congress from enacting a correcting statute. The contrary
effect, however, is that legislative coalitions, anticipating judicial
behavior, may broaden the scope of statutes when they are first enacted,
packaging suspect provisions with unimpeachable provisions in order
to ensure that the suspect provisions are held constitutional. The
volume of federal lawmaking is a function not only of the number of
extant statutes, but also of their scope.
The perverse effect of
intermediate intensities of review is to reduce the number of statutes
while broadening the scope of new enactments. The latter effect may
dominate the former.
There is also a more subtle argument: courts should not worry
about the perverse effect of current doctrine because the harms of the
perverse effect, if any, have already been felt. The aggregation doctrine
has been around at least since Wickard; the comprehensive-scheme
principle has roots in the Shreveport Rate Cases from 1914, and it flowers
no later than 1981, when the Court decided Hodel. Perhaps Congress has
already broadened and bundled its enactments to account for these
doctrines. If, on the other hand, Congress is not sensitive to Commerce
Clause doctrine, then the Court's recent decision to initiate more
aggressive Commerce Clause review can’t make things worse (from the
decentralizers' standpoint).
But this point fails to distinguish two possible roles that doctrines
such as the aggregation and comprehensive-scheme principles might
play: (1) as safe harbors for congressional exercise of the commerce
power; or (2) as restrictions on the exercise of that power. In Wickard
and the other cases, the effect of emphasizing aggregation or
comprehensiveness was to make safely constitutional a law that pressed
the limits of contemporaneous Commerce Clause doctrine.58 After that
sort of opinion, it’s quite easy to imagine congressional coalitions
drawing the lesson that such doctrines are safe harbors but not
restrictions; the Court would invoke them to sustain legislation that
regulated in trastate activities, but would not point to their absence to
invalidate intrastate legislation. In that case there would be no incentive
to broaden or bundle enactments. The incentive arises only if the
doctrines cut both ways, so that meeting their conditions validates an
intrastate regulation, while failing their conditions makes the regulation
invalid.
58. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).

This view explains the seeming puzzle that Lopez has been the most
dramatic Commerce Clause decision in decades even though it effected
little surface change in Commerce Clause doctrine. The answer to the
puzzle is that before Lopez, the nominal limits on the commerce power
weren’t enforced; legislators had every reason to believe that the Court's
repeated warnings about limits on the commerce power were cheap
talk, and that any new statute regulating intrastate activity would be
upheld on some ground or other. That answer, however, exacerbates
our uncertainty about the possibility of perverse effects in the future. In
the prior period, legislators might have thought that any intrastate
regulation could be enacted under the commerce power, but in
important instances – such as the Gun-Free School Zones Act – they
chose to enact regulations of very confined scope. Lopez and Morrison
now give legislators reason to believe that the aggregation and
comprehensive-scheme principles serve as restrictions, and thus create
the incentive to bundle and broaden provisions into larger and more
centralized packages. That incentive will operate, to some degree, in the
short and medium-term; but it is still far too early to tell how strong the
perverse effect will be.
So what should the judges do in the face of this uncertainty? The
judge who favors centralization shouldn’t worry too much about the
revival of Commerce Clause review; in this arena the decentralizers may
just be spiking the ball in their own end zone. True, the centralizing
judge who is certain that the perverse effect will hold, and that no other
judge knows this, might slyly vote for expanded Commerce Clause
review, but in the face of uncertainty that strategy is too clever by half;
better for the centralizing judge to turn to other, more pressing battles.
The harder question is what the judge who favors decentralization
should do. The sensible answer, it seems to me, is to shift to other
means of promoting decentralization.59 The possibility of perverse
59. I agree with much of Ernie Young's thoughtful discussion of the perversity
critique. See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV . __
(2000). But I disagree that the critical question is whether Commerce Clause review
is "in fact more likely" to produce centralizing effects or decentralizing effects. Id. at
__. This misapprehends the effect that the risk of perverse results has on the ex ante
decision that faces the decentralizing judge. Ex ante, the decentralizing judge may
invest in a variety of instruments for promoting decentralization, including attempts
to increase the stringency of Commerce Clause review, but also including activities
such as commandeering review, Eleventh Amendment scrutiny, lobbying Congress
in opposition to new federal laws, donating to states -rights organizations, and so on.
The risk that Commerce Clause review will increase centralization reduces the
expected value of that instrument, relative to the alternatives, and that reduction in
expected value should in turn cause a shift to other instruments at the margin.
Because this effect takes place at the margin, it is irrelevant whether the perverse
(centralizing) effect is more probable than not. The less likely the perverse effect the
less the reduction in expected value, but in any case Comm erce Clause review
becomes less attractive to the decentralizer than it would be if perverse effects were
certain not to occur.
Professor Young is correct that this account assumes limited judicial resources,
including political capital, an assumption that Professor Young appears to share. See
id. at __, n.__. But it is irrelevant, on the other hand, whether or not "the perverse
effects engendered by other forms of substantive review may be substantially worse
than the risks posed by Commerce Clause review." Id. at __. Again, the possibility of
perverse effects reduces the expected value (to the decentralizer) of Commerce

effects could probably be avoided by moving to extremely aggressive
Commerce Clause review, but that is politically infeasible. Given that
the only real choice – between moderate review that might be perverse
and no review at all – is afflicted by severe uncertainty, the tiebreaker
ought to be the consideration that if decentralization is the aim, it can be
pursued more efficiently by other means.
One option for decentralizers would be further development of the
commandeering case law or the state sovereign-immunity case law. I
mentioned at the outset that the story about perverse effects seems much
cleaner and easier to tell for the commerce power than for the other
areas of the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. There should thus
be little fear that these substitutes will prove equally perverse. True, in
those areas the decentralizer gets less bang for the buck, because rules
that prohibit commandeering and invasions of state sovereign immunity
merely preclude certain means of enforcing federal policies; they do not
preclude the policy altogether. But if Commerce Clause review really
does pose a risk of perverse effects, then these substitute doctrines,
however feeble, cannot help but appear relatively more attractive, from
the decentralizer's point of view.

Clause review, which in turn should promote a shift to those other instruments at the
margin, however attractive or unattractive the alternatives would otherwise be. The
upshot is that the magnitude of the perverse effect is unclear, both to Professor
Young and myself, but that the uncertainty should nonetheless cause rational
decentralizers to shift away from Commerce Clause review and towards other tactics.

